Cybersecurity
Every breach post-mortem ends at your program.
A FalseGreen Job verifies the exact program you ship — code, pinned dependencies, secrets, supply chain — against a frozen contract.
The problem
The breach path runs through your code and your dependencies.
Vulnerability exploitation is the most common way into a breach — 31% of breaches in 2026, up from 20% the year before.
Equifax cost $1.4B — a disclosed fix that never reached the software running in production.
Supply-chain compromise is the #2-cost breach vector — $4.91M per incident, 267 days to identify and contain. The payload rides in packages you already trust.
Sources: Verizon DBIR 2026 and IBM 2026 via Secureframe · IBM Cost of a Data Breach 2025
The record
The supply chain is a risk and a running campaign.
Sep 8, 2025 — chalk / debug hijacked on npm
One phished maintainer account poisoned 18 packages with 2.6 billion weekly downloads. Credential- and key-stealing code rode into builds for hours.
Source: Upwind 2025
Nov 2025 — Shai-Hulud, the first npm worm
A self-propagating worm compromised 492 packages and drew a public CISA alert. Credential theft on developer machines, at registry scale.
Source: Palo Alto Unit 42 2025
Aug 20, 2026 — crates.io: arrayref hijacked
A maintainer account was compromised and a typosquatted proc-macro carrying a build-time dropper entered 245 million downloads of Rust — reverse-deps include blake3 and winit. Cargo still has no publish-age or install-script control.
Source: Wiz 2026
Sep–Oct 2026 — CHAINDROP worm, 400+ npm packages
A compromised keyv maintainer cascaded through co-owned packages totalling 1.3 billion monthly downloads. One malicious release shipped with a valid provenance attestation.
Source: Elastic Security Labs 2026
Oct 21, 2026 — PHP2Shell
CVSS 9.2 unauthenticated RCE in the PHP engine — roughly 70% of websites. Attackers were probing before disclosure; government sites went dark to patch. The flaw was memory safety: a bug class Rust eliminates at compile time.
Honest coverage
What a FalseGreen Job defends. And what it does not.
Exploited vulnerabilities are now the #1 initial-access vector in breaches — 31%, up from 20%. A FalseGreen Job decides your criteria, invariants, and proofs on the exact bytes you ship.
The security lane checks every pinned dependency against OSV advisories — vulnerable only if your exact pinned version falls inside the affected range — plus SBOM, secret scanning, and SAST.
Every FalseGreen Job re-runs the security lane against live advisories — and the Gate makes that verdict a CI requirement. A pinned dependency with a known advisory fails the next Job, and the pull request carrying it is blocked until it is fixed.
"Were we exposed to PHP2Shell / CHAINDROP at release?" The report names the whole verified dependency graph and can be re-checked offline by anyone — a minutes answer, not a war room.
Phishing is the most common initial vector in breaches (16%). No software verification tool stops it. We don't claim to.
Stolen keys and privileged accounts cause some of the largest losses in security incidents. That is hardware, custody, and identity tooling — not program verification.
A brand-new malicious crate is caught only once an advisory exists. FalseGreen checks the known graph; no scanner does more and says so.
The math
$4.91M
average supply-chain compromise — the #2-cost breach vector
$1.4B
Equifax: a disclosed patch that never reached production
$2,999
one FalseGreen Job per release — plus the Gate check on every pull request, free
Sources: IBM 2025 · NotPetya & Equifax retrospectives
One FalseGreen Job, security lane